Soldiers, villagers, and politics : military violence and the Jacquerie of 1358 by Firnhaber-Baker, Justine
Soldiers, Villagers, and Politics: Military Violence and the Jacquerie of 1358 
Justine Firnhaber-Baker, University of St Andrews 
 
The Jacquerie of 1358, in which the rural inhabitants of the Île-de-France, Picardy, Champagne, 
and parts of Normandy rose up and attacked the nobility, remains a hotly contested incident, but 
the importance of soldiers as a cause of the revolt is one of the few things on which scholars 
agree. Siméon Luce, whose book remains the only scholarly monograph on the event, argued 
that the Jacquerie was a pre-emptive effort, coordinated with anti-royal rebels in Paris, to destroy 
castles that had been recently slated for garrisoning by soldiers, who would brutalize the 
countryside’s inhabitants and threaten rebel’s position in Paris1. Jules Flammermont – who 
agreed with Luce on hardly anything about the Jacquerie – also thought that soldiers were at the 
root of it, though he imagined the matter more simply: The Jacquerie was an unplanned rising, 
accidentally set off by a fight between soldiers and peasants, which gave an outlet to the 
peasants’ centuries of accumulated hatred against the nobility2. More recent historians continue 
to be divided as to whether the Jacquerie was coordinated with or even directed by Paris or a 
spontaneous uprising organic to the countryside3. But all hold that the presence of soldiers 
created intolerable insecurity for rural inhabitants who were moved, whether by calculated self-
interest, outside manipulation, or drunken bloodlust, to oppose the pillagers with violence. As 
Nicholas Wright concludes, ‘there can be little doubt that it was the presence of large numbers 
of soldiers … which was the spark of the revolt’4. 
There is ample evidence that soldiers, many of them foreign-born mercenaries, had become a 
serious threat to health and safety in many parts of France by 1358. Due to the lull in hostilities 
that followed the Battle of Poitiers in 1356, where the English resoundingly defeated the French 
and took King Jean II captive, thousands of soldiers found themselves without commanders or 
wages. Many of these then formed independent companies, occupying castles, pillaging for their 
own profit, brutalizing local inhabitants, and holding rural settlements to ransom5. The situation 
was made worse for the common people by the failure of both the crown and the nobility to 
exercise effective authority. In the months and years after Poitiers, royal government was weak 
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or even simply absent. In Paris, the adolescent Dauphin Charles was nominally in control, but in 
fact had to cede most of his power to a coalition led by the prévôt of the Paris merchants Étienne 
Marcel and his close associate Bishop Robert le Coq of Laon6. Dedicated to the cause of reform 
and good governance, this coalition nevertheless impeded the normal working of government by 
purges and the substitution of inexperienced men for those whom they deemed corrupt7. When 
the uneasy modus vivendi between this coalition and the Dauphin broke down in the winter and 
spring of 1358, the two sides began preparing for war. Adding to insecurity was King Charles II 
of Navarre, who possessed both a reasonable claim to the French throne and a large number of 
soldiers, and who maintained a threateningly high profile in northern France8, occupying much 
of Normandy and the Beauce and (at least initially) allying closely with the Dauphin’s enemies in 
Paris9. As for the nobility, their legitimacy had been seriously harmed by perceived cowardice at 
Poitiers, and there was a general feeling that they had not only abdicated their responsibility to 
protect the laboratores, but were also joining in the pillaging themselves10. 
The Jacquerie as an outburst of rural rage against villagers’ traditional protectors – the nobility – 
for the failure to defend them from the violence of soldiers thus makes a great deal of contextual 
sense. There is, as we shall see, substantial evidence of rustic anger against aristocrats and a 
feeling that local communities had to take on the responsibility of defense for themselves in the 
absence of both royal and seigneurial protection. This is not dissimilar to the circumstances that 
led the famous peasant leader Grand Ferré and his community to defend themselves (though 
with royal permission) against English troops in 135911. Comparing the geography and timing of 
the Jacquerie to that of the various military bands at work in northern France from 1356 to the 
revolt’s beginning in late May 1358, though, shows that few communities that participated in the 
Jacquerie had direct experience of military violence. Most of them could only have feared what 
they had heard about second-hand. Attention to place and time suggests rather that the Jacquerie 
was closely related to the strategic aims of the Parisians, whose conflict with the Dauphin – and 
his close allies, the nobility – had come to the boiling point by mid May. While this should not 
lead us to discount evidence about the fear of soldiers, it is important to consider how the 
leaders of the revolt used that fear, and how the language of fear is deployed in the documents, 
to motivate or excuse the acts that the Jacques committed.  
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 I. Localizing Insecurity, 1355–58 
The insecurity upon which the Jacquerie has often been blamed was not localized to the revolt’s 
heartlands in the Île-de-France, Picardy, and Champagne. Rather, this insecurity was a condition 
that plagued many parts of rural France much more seriously than the Jacquerie’s epicenters and 
which had been growing for several years before the revolt. Much of it was related to the royal 
armies directly involved in the Hundred Years War. Indeed, real panic about soldiers was first 
stirred up by the famous chevauchée in Languedoc that Edward, Prince of Wales, had undertaken 
in autumn of 1355, which had terrified the whole realm and advertised traditional authorities’ 
impotence12. The king’s own soldiers were not much better behaved; evidence of their 
depredations can be found in a famous clause of the ordonnance promulgated by the Estates 
General assembly of Languedoïl in late 1355, which authorized individuals and communities to 
resist pillaging soldiers (soudoiers) forcibly and on their own authority13. When Charles of Navarre 
was arrested in April of 1356 under accusations of treachery, a new war opened up in Normandy 
under the command of Charles’s brother Philip, who allied with England and declared war on 
France in May14. It was a new chevauchée by the Prince of Wales in August that drew French royal 
troops away from the war in Normandy and led them, disastrously, to Poitiers in September15.  
That military disaster, the captive King’s absence, and the Dauphin’s inexperience, obviously did 
nothing to ameliorate the situation. After Poitiers, the sites of violence became more numerous 
and spread north and eastward under the auspices both of royal troops and of less formally 
constituted groups acting for their own profit. To summarize Jonathan Sumption’s narrative 
synthesis of the period16: In the winter of 1356–1357, the Navarrese and the English occupied 
western Normandy, and Philippe of Navarre rode east in January as far as l’Aigle17 before 
heading South through the Chartrain and then returning to Normandy, a venture that panicked 
the capital. English adventurers, eager to make their fortunes by pillage, poured into France. By 
the summer of 1357, numerous bands, not clearly subject to any higher authority, spread out 
through Normandy, occupying the small fortresses and strong places of the duchy. Anglo-
Navarrese troops seized Honfleur18, thus taking control of the Seine estuary, and another 1,400 
                                                 
12 Sumption 1990-present, II, 175–187; Hewitt 1958. 
13 Et pour ce que pour fournir nostre Guerre, il Nous convient avoir des Soudoiers dehors nostre Royaume, tant de Genz de cheval 
comme de pié, lesquelz aucunes foiz pillent et robbent … Nous voulons que chascun leur puisse resister par voie de fait (Laurière & al., 
eds. 1723–1849, III, 36). 
14 Delachenal 1909–1931, I, ch. 5. 
15 Rogers 2000, 7–8 and ch. 10 
16 For what follows, Sumption 1990–present, II, 268–304. 
17 Orne, ch.l. de con 
18 Calvados, ch.-l. de con. 
troops arrived in the autumn, enabling Navarrese control of most of that river’s southern bank. 
Southwest of Paris, the Beauce came under attack. A man called Ruffin led his bands on 
pillaging expeditions between the Loire and the Seine, attacking at least a dozen towns and 
villages. 
Over the winter of 1357–1358, Paris and the Île-de-France began to feel seriously threatened: the 
Dauphin’s own soldiers pillaged the Chartrain in lieu of wages19. The south-west was also 
victimized by troops associated with Charles of Navarre under the command of an adventurer 
called James Pipe. Pipe’s men took over the castle at Épernon20 some 30 km north of Chartres, 
from which they ravaged the surrounding countryside that spring, moving east to the Gâtinais in 
May, burning Nemours and damaging Grez21. To the east in Champagne there were additional 
troop movements. In December 1357, the royal bailiff of Provins and Meaux had to pay gens 
d’armes to deal with ‘enemies’, as well as to visit certain maisons fors near Provins from which 
soldiers had damaged the countryside22. In early April, after an assembly dominated by nobles at 
Provins, the Dauphin broke decisively with Paris and began military preparations to take back 
the city, requisitioning the castles at Montereau-Fault-Yonne and Meaux23. The townsmen’s 
irritation at the garrison at Meaux is well known, and at Montereau, the commander later 
received remission for holding to ransom the countryside’s merchants and bonnes gens and stealing 
their goods24. 
 
II. Jacques and Soldiers 
Thus, in late May 1358, when the Jacquerie broke out, the countryside to the west, south, and 
east of the Île-de-France, running in a rough crescent from Honfleur to Nemours with outposts 
in Montereau and Meaux, was occupied by troops, including men fighting for the French crown 
or the Anglo-Navarrese, as well as independent bands without clear allegiances. Only the regions 
to the north/northeast in a triangle running from Paris to the Vexin and Picardy, had not been 
subject to pillaging soldiers in the aftermath of Poitiers. These regions are, of course, exactly the 
area from which we have the most evidence for participation in the Jacquerie. Stretching from 
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Auffay in eastern Normandy to the eastern Amiénois and running south to Soissons, the 
uprisings mentioned in the sources, the bulk of which are letters of remission for Jacques, were 
undertaken by people in the northern Île-de-France, the Beauvaisis, the county of Clermont, and 
Picardy25. A thick line of implicated villages snakes up the River Oise from Pontoise to 
Compiègne, and another runs down the Thérain between Beauvais and Montataire26. Despite 
Luce’s assertion that it was ‘precisely in the regions [in which soldiers had been pillaging] that the 
Jacquerie would erupt’27, in fact, when the revolt broke out at Saint-Leu-d’Esserent28 and 
Cramoisy in the Beauvaisis, it brought large-scale violence to one of the few regions of northern 
France that had not yet known it.  
In only three instances on the periphery of this area can we substantiate participation in the 
Jacquerie against existing garrisons of soldiers. There is one explicit, if isolated case from western 
Picardy, where one Simon Doublet, who served as captain of several villages during the 
Jacquerie, received a letter of royal pardon, which recounts how the ravages of ‘the English and 
other enemies’ led to the communities’ decision to destroy noble castles: 
Since, in order to consider how each region could rightfully best resist the English and 
other enemies of the Realm of France, who had been pillaging and destroying the 
countryside from the castles and fortresses which they had taken …, the inhabitants of 
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to 1359. Also post-Jacquerie are the episodes of routier violence in some letters of remission he cited and the scenes 
the famous peasants Guillaume l’Aloue and Grand-Ferré’s bravery in the supposed Jean de Venette’s chronicle (ed. 
Beaune 2011, 206–215). For Flammermont’s part, his assertion that the Dauphin’s troops ravaged ‘the Beauce, the 
Île-de-France and the Beauvaisis’ is not supported by the source he cited, Étienne Marcel’s letter to the Dauphin, 
which as mentioned above, complains about soldiers to Paris’s south and west (Flammermont 1879, 124). 
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Grandvilliers, Poix and Lignières, recently assembled on the field in arms … and by 
common decision elected Simon Doublet of Grandvilliers their captain, giving him orders 
… to go attack some castles, houses, places, and fortresses of some of the nobles of those 
frontiers and regions…29 
 
It is possible that the fortress at Poix had already fallen into the hands of the English by May 
1358 and that the villagers were reacting to this30, but the other two cases from the northwest are 
more ambiguous: According to the Norman chronicler, during the Jacquerie there were attacks 
against the fortresses at Villepreux and Trappes, both of which the royal chronicler reported as 
falling into Anglo-Navarrese hands in late 135731. The role of military violence against local 
inhabitants as a motivation for this attack is unclear, though, as the Norman chronicler stated 
that it was done at the behest of Étienne Marcel and a later judicial source reports that the 
violence at Trappes was directed not at Anglo-Navarrese soldiers, but at the house of a French 
knight ‘whom the Parisians detested’32.  
In Champagne, where an area around Saint-Dizier saw significant participation in the Jacquerie33, 
a cluster of remissions issued to individuals in the bailliage of Vitry attests to the fear of soldiers 
in similar terms to that of Simon Doublet’s remission. One relates that local villages, now 
standing accused of participation in the revolt, had assembled for self-defense since was 
‘common knowledge through the whole region of Champagne, that the Lorrainers and the 
Germans or other enemies of the realm meant to pillage and burn the region’34. Another 
remission explained that local communities were allowed to assemble ‘for the tuition and defense 
of the parish and resistance to the enemies’ and that when the village of Bailly-aux-Forges 
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30 Luce 1895, 26 argued this was the case, but the arrêt he cited leaves the date ambiguous, noting only the year the 
castle’s lord left it to serve in the royal army and that the castle was taken in consequence (published in Timbal, ed., 
1961, 286–87). The Chronique des quatre premiers Valois, however, lists Poix among the castles taken by Navarrese 
forces in the autumn of 1358 (Luce, ed. 1862, 87). 
31 Trappes, Yvelines, ch.-l. de con; Villepreux, Yvelines, con of Saint-Nom-la-Bretèche, Molinier & Molinier, 
eds. 1882, 128; Delachenal, ed. 1910–1920, I, 127.  
32 Luce 1895, 220, citing AN X1a 21, fol. 481–482. 
33 Saint-Dizier (Haute-Marne, ch.-l. d’arrt.): AN JJ 86, no. 258, fol. 86v–87r (Sompuis, Marne, ch.-l. de con); Luce 
1895, no. 32 (Bettancourt-la-Ferrée, Haute-Marne, con of Saint-Dizier); AN JJ 95, no. 22, fol. 10v–11r (Blacy, Marne, 
con of Vitry-le-François); AN JJ 86, nos. 358-360, fol. 122 (Vitry-la-Ville, Marne, con of Écury-sur-Coole; Étrepy, 
Marne, con of Thiéblemont-Farémont and Drouilly, Marne, con of Vitry-le-François); Luce 1895, no. 34 (Saint-Vrain 
and Blacy); AN JJ 86, no. 578, fol. 209v–210r, confirmed at AN JJ 95, no. 116, fol. 44v (Saint-Lumier-en-
Champagne, Marne, con of Thiéblemont-Farémont and Saint-Vrain, idem), and see the next three notes.  
34 Luce 1895, no. 33. 
actually did so, it was because ‘many soldiers committed many excesses in some towns of these 
bailliages’35. In a third case, the royal pardon states that ‘during the commotions [i.e. the 
Jacquerie] in various areas of the realm last summer, the inhabitants of numerous Perthois 
villages assembled in order to decide how they could best resist the evil designs of some 
foreigners, whom they mistrusted, as well as the nobles of the realm’36. In these cases, as for 
Poix, there is some corroborating evidence of the presence of soldiers, and it is possible that the 
Dauphin’s entourage and those of the noblemen riding to join his forces had created some 
disturbances37. But it is notable that only one of the three cases from Vitry indicates that the 
community was responding to violence that had already occurred. The presence of soldiers was a 
fairly recent occurrence of limited extent in Champagne relative to the occupation of other 
territories. Indeed, when the Dauphin moved in April to garrison the eastern castles, Étienne 
Marcel wrote to him to complain that this area was not in need of defense because the soldiers 
causing problems were all to the southwest, between Paris and Chartres: les gens d’armes qui sont en 
vostre compagnie fussent mielx à vostre honneur entre Paris et Chartres, là où sont les ennemis que là où vous 
estes, qui est paiis de pais et sans guerre38.  
This southwestern area of such concern to Marcel did witness significant participation in the 
Jacquerie39, and there is some specific overlap here between the movements of soldiers and the 
revolt. Of the near dozen places that Jean le Bel and Froissart listed as overrun by ‘Ruffin’ and 
his band in the southern Île-de-France, three of them, Étampes, Châtres, and Montlhéry, were in 
the path of people who later rose during the Jacquerie40. The garrison of the château at 
Montereau, which had been requisitioned by the Dauphin in April, was later remitted for 
pillaging merchants and bonnes gens du plat pays during, as well as before and after, the Jacquerie, as 
                                                 
35 Bailly-aux-Forges, Haute-Marne, con of Wassy, ibid., no. 40. 
36 Ibid., no. 46. 
37 See n. 22, above. Luce 1895, 21, n. 2 (where a reference to Froissart, ed. Luce & al. 1869–present, V, 134–136 is 
not given) admits that his source places mercenaries in Champagne only toward the end of 1358, but his instinct to 
put them there earlier may have been right nonetheless. For the Dauphin in April 1358, see Delachenal, ed. 1910–
1920, I, 164–170. There are some complaints about the violence of this host once assembled (e.g. AN JJ 86, no. 202, 
fol. 66r), but this was after the Jacquerie. 
38 Chartres, Eure-et-Loir. Edited in d’Avout 1960, 302. 
39 Southern Île-de-France: AN JJ 86, no. 329, fol. 110v (Fontenay-lès-Briis, Essonne, con of Limours); AN JJ 86, 
no. 316, fol. 105v–106r (Saulx-les-Chartreux, Essonne, con of Villebon-sur-Yvette); AN JJ 86, no. 304, fol. 101v 
(Longjumeau, Essonne, ch.-l. de con); AN JJ 86, no. 232, fol. 76r and AN JJ 86, no. 306, fol. 102r (Grigny, Essonne, 
ch.-l. de con), AN JJ 86, no. 364, fol. 124 (Saint-Fargeau, Yonne, ch.-l. de con); and see below, for Étampes (Essonne, 
ch.-l. de con), Montlhéry (Essonne, ch.-l. de con), Châtres (Seine-et-Marne, con of Tournan-en-Brie), and Boissy-sous-
Saint-Yon (Essonne, con of Saint-Chéron). 
40
 Jean le Bel, ed. Viard & Déprez 1904–1905, II, 249–250; Froissart, ed. Luce & al. 1869–present, V, 95. Étampes: 
Luce 1895, no. 23 and AN JJ 86, no. 385 (corr. 395), fol. 137v. Châtres: Luce 1895, no. 30. Montlhéry: AN JJ 86, 
no. 297, fol. 99v. 
were members of the garrison of Étampes, by then also back in royal hands41. The village of 
Boissy-sous-Saint-Yon fled before James Pipe’s troops on 15 May 1358 and was later remitted 
for participation in the Jacquerie42. But it is not necessarily the case that these incidents should be 
understood as part of the Jacquerie. The best candidate for such overlap is at Étampes, where 
the bonnes gens, tired of being murdered, pillaged, and raped by the garrison, attacked the castle. 
There is no extant remission issued to them specifically for this act, but the inhabitants of the 
county of Étampes were included in the general remission issued for the Jacquerie and the noble 
reaction to it, and the remission for the soldiers who repulsed the attack on the castle cites this 
plenary remission as part of the rationale for forgiveness43. In the other cases, the relationship 
between actual military violence and Jacquerie is much less clear. The documents draw no 
connection between the troops present in the area and the participation of the inhabitants of 
Châtres and Montlhéry in the uprisings. At Boissy-sous-Saint-Yon, the inhabitants ran from 
rather than fought against Pipe’s men, an act recounted in a different document than their letter 
of remission for the Jacquerie and which makes no appearance even as an excuse for that 
violence.  
The evidence for firsthand experience of violence at the hands of military men by communities 
involved in the Jacquerie is thus fairly limited. Most of the areas that played host to the revolt 
were relatively unaffected by troops’ predations, and even in those places where they did overlap, 
we have only a few instances in which behavior understood as revolt was directed at soldiers44. 
Furthermore, if we look at regions farther to the south and west that we know to have been 
certainly and significantly affected by military violence against civilians between 1356–1358, there 
is no evidence of revolt, though there is a fair amount of evidence of resistance to soldiers. In 
the winter of 1358, for example, villagers attacked the stipendarii of Bruyères-le-Châtel in the 
Chartrain, for failure to pay for their provisions45, and south of Sens, the inhabitants of Branches 
attacked some rude vagabonds out of fear that they were depredatores seu pillatores46. In Cravant, 
                                                 
41 Montereau: tant durant le temps de la discussion qui a été entre les nobles et les gens du plat pais, comme devant et après, ayent fait 
plusieurs prinses … (AN P 2293, p. 453–56). Discencion should be read in place of discussion, probably a mistake of the 
eighteenth-century copyist. Étampes: AN JJ 86, no. 385 (corr. 395), fol. 137v where the Dauphin’s permission to 
pillage in lieu of wages is explicitly mentioned as the rationale for a garrison’s depredations 
42 Fleeing soldiers: AN JJ 86, no. 122, fol. 44v–45r; Jacquerie: AN JJ 86, no. 215, fol. 70. 
43 General remission: Luce 1895, no. 23. General remission cited: AN JJ 86, no. 385 (corr. 395), fol. 137v. Sumption 
1990–present, II, 331 sees this incident as incited by Étienne Marcel’s commands to the Jacques given at Chilly-
Mazarin (Essonne, ch.-l. de con) on 24 June, which is mentioned in a remission to the crier of Châtres (Luce 1895, 
no. 30). See discussion below. 
44 Guy Fourquin sought to explain this discrepancy with reference to the poor grain prices that those in the 
Beauvaisis had experienced ‘since 1315’, but obviously, as Leguai pointed out, a circumstance that had already 
endured for four decades hardly explains why the revolt broke out just then (Fourquin 1964, 233; Leguai 1982, 55). 
45 Essonne, con of Arpajon, AN JJ 86, no. 105, fol. 38r. 
46 Yonne, con of Aillant-sur-Tholon, AN JJ 86, no. 260, fol. 87v. 
near Auxerre, the inhabitants, who had been terrorized by the Anglo-Navarrese, attacked and 
imprisoned a knight and his men because they ‘thought that they were enemies, or at least not 
honest people’ (ennemis, ou au moins non estre bonnes genz)47. None of these villages was later 
involved in the Jacquerie.  
 
III. The Targets of the Jacquerie: Nobles and their Fortresses 
The Jacquerie is differentiated from communal efforts of self-defense or vengeance not only by 
geography, but also by the language the documents use for their targets. At Boissy, Bruyères, 
Branches, and Cravant, the villagers attacked soldiers, characterized as such by military, moral, or 
political terms: stipendarii, pillatores, depredatores, inimici/ennemis. By contrast, remissions for 
communities and individuals involved in the Jacquerie identify the targets almost without 
exception as nobles and their property. The usual formula in the Jacquerie remissions speaks of 
the uprising undertaken by the people of the open countryside (gens du plat pays) against the 
nobility (les nobles) – or, less commonly, as the conflict that occurred between the nonnobles and 
the nobles – during which their fortresses and goods were destroyed48. For the royal lawyers and 
clerks who redacted remissions, the people victimized by the Jacquerie were different from those 
targeted at Bruyères or Cravant, or at least, what was important about them in that context was 
different. But semantics do not tell the whole story here, for the line between soldier and noble 
was naturally a blurry one in a society dominated by a military aristocracy49. Indeed we can see 
such conflation at Poix, where the depredations of ‘the English and other enemies of the Realm 
of France’ incited the villagers to ‘attack some castles, houses, places, and fortresses of some of 
the nobles’50, and in the Perthois villages, where people were anxious not only about ‘some 
foreigners’ but also about ‘the nobles of the realm’51. And if actual military violence did not incite 
social revolt, anxiety about the potential of such violence could have led communities, who had 
grown mistrustful of traditional authorities, to take prophylactic action. 
That the Jacquerie erupted to prevent the garrisoning of castles was, of course, a central element 
of Luce’s explanation for the revolt. He blamed it on a decision taken at the assembly of the 
                                                 
47 Cravant, Yonne, con of Vermenton. Luce 1895, no. 42. Luce published the remission for this last incident as 
Jacquerie document, but there is no indication in the text itself that these deeds were part of the Jacquerie, and it is 
not clear from the document even when it happened. Note that bonnes genz may not simply mean good people but 
rather common-born local inhabitants. 
48 commotions qui nagaires et derreinement ont este fait par les gens du plat pais contre les nobles du royaume, a formula which is 
found, with some variation, in about one-third of the remissions. For the less common entre nobles et nonnobles/inter 
innobiles et nobiles see AN JJ 86, no. 372, fol. 127r; Luce 1895, no. 36; AN JJ 95, no. 121, fol. 47–48r, among others.  
49 Wright 1998, 56; indeed, many of the most famous and successful ‘freebooters’ of the age hailed from noble 
households (Fowler 2001). 
50 AN JJ 86, no. 392, fol. 136. 
51 Luce 1895, no. 46. 
Estates of Vermandois at Compiègne in early May to put the region’s fortresses in a state of 
readiness, which meant that the castles would soon be home to soldiers who would pillage the 
countryside52. Flammermont argued that Luce was wrong about the importance of this decision 
because the provision in question was not substantially different from similar clauses contained 
in promulgations of earlier such assemblies, which had not provoked an outpouring of rustic 
fury53. Flammermont’s point is well taken, but as Luce recognized, the clause also ordered  
destroyed those fortresses whose possessors would not or could repair them54. This stipulation 
had also been part of earlier promulgations, and in fact, it appears that the Dauphin and the 
coalition led by Étienne Marcel had pursued a programme of inspection and destruction or 
reparation of castles over the autumn and winter of 1357–1358, specifically so that they could 
not become the redoubt of the ‘enemies’ or other predatory troops55. This policy may have been 
an important contributor to the Jacquerie, which, as is not always fully recognized, was primarily 
aimed not at noble bodies, but rather at their fortresses. While Froissart and Jean le Bel almost 
certainly overstate the amount of interpersonal violence involved in the revolt – individual 
nobles killed by the Jacques number around two or three dozen, and we have no documentary 
evidence of rape – Jean le Bel was probably not exaggerating much when he counted 140 
fortifications as damaged or even destroyed during the revolt56.  
The Jacques’ attacks on castles were, as Luce and others have argued, also in line with other 
provisions of earlier meetings of the Estates had authorized self-defence for the resisting of 
soldiers57. The remissions for some of the Champenois villages that had assembled in order to 
resist soldiers speak of ordonnances authorizing their behavior58. In the years following Poitiers, 
there does seem to have been a general feeling that traditional authorities, especially the nobility, 
had abdicated their responsibilities and that communities had to organize their own defense. 
Both Jean de Venette and the Norman chronicler famously speak of the peasants’ 
disappointment in the nobility, particularly regarding the issue of security59. In most of the 
Jacquerie areas, as we have seen, security was a prospective concern rather than the fruit of bitter 
experience, but the anxiety and anger involved may nonetheless have been quite acute. A 
                                                 
52 Explicitly at Luce 1895, 54. 
53 Flammermont 1879, 126. 
54 les abatent ou facent abbatre et arraser, si que dommage n’en vieigne (Laurière & al., eds. 1723–1849, III, 224). 
55 E.g. AN JJ 90, no. 563, fol. 278; Musée de Paris AE II 376 (formerly AN K 948b, no. 40). 
56 Fourquin 1964, 240. Aiton 2007 notes that rape is not mentioned in a single remission for the Jacquerie. For the 
narrative function of rape in the chronicles see de Medeiros 1979. Jean le Bel, ed. Viard & Déprez 1904–1905, II, 
257.  
57 Laurière, ed. 1723–1849, III, 19–37, 121–46; Luce 1895, 160–164; Durvin 1978; Firnhaber-Baker 2014, 368–371.  
58 Luce 1895, no. 33 and 40. 
59 See n. 10, above. 
remission for an inhabitant of Arcy-Sainte-Restitue, south of Soissons, for example, recounts the 
reproaches laid upon the village’s lord, about to ride off and leave the village unprotected, and 
the threat that if he would not protect them, then they would have to protect themselves60. The 
village had not yet known any violence, but the lord’s disregard of the inhabitants’ fears 
fomented anger against him, nonetheless. 
 
IV. The Politics of Fear 
If we can connect the Jacquerie more securely with fear of and preventative action against 
soldiers than with actual violence, though, the question of timing becomes more acute. There 
had been soldiers near (though not in) the Jacquerie heartlands for over a year by May 1358, and 
anger at the nobility, particularly for their military failings, had been running high since at least 
Poitiers. Here, attention to space and time provides support for Luce’s other theory about the 
Jacquerie: that it was directed at the enemies of the Parisian revolt led by Étienne Marcel and 
Robert le Coq. While Flammermont dismissed this possibility out of hand as impossible because 
cela suppose un complot et par conséquent des hommes capables de raisonner, Raymond Cazelles argued that 
Luce was right: Il y a certainement eu concertation61. Unlike Flammermont, whose objections rested 
entirely upon his view of the peasantry as drunken louts, Luce and Cazelles adduced significant 
evidence for their theories, including evidence of communication between the Jacques and the 
Parisians, as well as their cooperation in some military expeditions, especially around Paris and to 
its northeast. Certainly, people in high places blamed the Parisian rebels for the Jacquerie. 
Innocent VI spoke of the events of June 1358 as authored by ‘the Parisians and very many 
people of other communities of those parts of the realm of France against many nobles of those 
parts’62. The Dauphin, writing at the end of July about the recent disturbances, charged Marcel 
with having stirred up (esmeu) the people against the nobles of the realm63. 
If there was significant coordination with Paris, many things about the timing of the Jacquerie 
and its targeting of the nobles make more sense. While the Estates at Compiègne may not have 
provided a new impetus for revolt because the clause about readying or destroying the castles 
was already a long-standing policy, the political circumstances of the meeting, at which the 
nobility dominated and the Parisians’ delegates were turned away, were indicative of the crisis of 
relations between the Dauphin and his noble allies on one side and Paris on the other. The 
                                                 
60 Aisne, con of Oulchy-le-Château, Luce 1895, no. 36. 
61 Flammermont 1879, 127; Cazelles 1978, 660. 
62 Parisienses et quamplurimi aliarum communitatum aliarum partium de regno Francie populi contra nonnullos ipsarum partium 
nobiles (Denifle & al., eds. 1889–1897, IV, no. 1239). 
63 d’avoir esmeu les gens du plat païs de France, de Beauvoisins, de Champaigne et d’autres lieux, contre les nobles du dit royaume… 
(published in Delachenal 1909–1931, II, no. 29). 
Parisians were aware of their danger. The Hôtel de Ville had been fortified with artillery from the 
Louvre, and the Parisians were holding armed assemblies of their citizens64. In May Marcel sent 
2,000 florins south to Avignon to hire soldiers (brigandi) and to buy arms for the defense of Paris, 
but the messenger was captured and the money seized65. Charles of Navarre was made captain of 
the city and fêted around town, though his troops were as much a threat to Parisian safety as 
those of the Dauphin66. As Cazelles pointed out, nothing could have been more strategically 
useful to the Parisian rebels in late May than a massive effort to destroy the countryside’s 
fortresses, crippling the Dauphin’s ability to cut Paris’s supply lines and preventing the nobility, 
his main allies, from joining his army67.  
Particularly north of Paris, where, as we have seen, the military oppression hypothesis is least 
demonstrable, the geographic spread of Jacquerie villages looks remarkably advantageous for 
Marcel. The concentration of villages in revolt along the Oise and Thérain rivers could easily be 
understood as a strategic counter-move to the Dauphin’s domination of the Marne68. The 
conflict at the river town of St-Leu-d’Esserent, where the Jacquerie allegedly began, was not an 
accidental confrontation, but rather, as Pierre Durvin showed, began when noble troops arrived 
in the town to take control of the town, which possessed both an important bridge over the Oise 
and supplies of stone for the reparation of castles69. Another theatre of revolt, Champagne, was, 
of course, home to the strongest noble support of the Dauphin70. It is also notable that two of 
the fortresses attacked during the Jacquerie, namely Trappes in the west and Étampes in the 
south, which had been held by Anglo-Navarrese troops, had passed back into the hands of the 
crown by May, again suggesting a strategic effort to counter the Dauphin71. Marcel himself, of 
course, denied involvement in the uprising in letters he wrote to Ypres in July, after the Jacquerie 
had been put down, but his denial was couched in narrow terms, and even there he admitted 
                                                 
64 Artillery: Delachenal, ed. 1910–1920, I, 170–171 and d’Avout 1960, 303; armed assemblies: AN JJ 86, no. 253, 
fol. 84v–85r (s’est a[r]mez aussi comme les autres et alez aus commandemenz des diz prevost et complices et aucunes foiz aus 
assemblees generalx qu’il faisoient en la dite ville). 
65 Secousse, ed. 1755, 142. 
66 Delachenal, ed. 1910–1920, I, 174. 
67 Cazelles 1978. 
68 For the Thérain and the Oise villages acting together see AN JJ 90, no. 148, fol. 79v-80r. Marcel had planned to 
claim the strategic fortress on the Marne at Meaux first but was pre-empted by the Dauphin (Delachenal, ed. 1910–
1920, I, 169). His interest in the rivers, necessary to the supply of Paris (see Cazelles, 1982, 291–292), is also 
demonstrated by his reported orders to a Jacques captain to destroy all the fortresses between deux eaux, in this case, 
the Seine and Oise (Luce 1895, no. 25). 
69 Durvin 1978; Cazelles 1978, 663. 
70 Delachenal, ed. 1910–1920, I, 164–168. 
71 See n. 31 and 43, above. 
having authority over the Jacques, claiming he told them not to kill women and children, at least, 
‘so long as he or she was not an enemy of Paris’ (se il n’estoit ennemi de la bonne ville de Paris)72. 
 It is possible, in fact, that Marcel and his agents used anxiety about soldiers in order to convince 
some people to participate in the Jacquerie. Remissions for supporters of Marcel state that he 
had not just usurped the government not just of Paris and the countryside around it, but that he 
had also ‘given people to believe that the Regent was going to allow the cities and the 
countryside to be pillaged by soldiers’73. Given the pre-existing policies of castle demolition and 
communal self-defence discussed above and the concurrent mistrust of the nobility, it would not 
be difficult to imagine fear of these troops’ arrival being used to incite and justify attacking the 
local castle or manor house, especially since it was at just this moment that the Dauphin was 
mustering the troops for his own army, simultaneously increasing the number of troops in the 
area and moving the nobility away from the localities they were to protect. It was the departure 
of Arcy-Sainte-Restitue’s lord for the Dauphin’s army, for example, that provoked his villagers’ 
remonstrations about being left to fend for themselves, and the lord of Poix blamed his absence 
for the enemy’s capture of his fortress74.  
More speculatively, the conflation of soldiers with nobles that we observed in several cases 
above from Picardy and Vitry suggests that anxiety about soldiers could be manipulated to direct 
anger at the nobility. In addition to the instances already noted, there is a case from Moret-sur-
Loing, west of Montereau on a tributary of the Seine, where, when the villagers raised the alarm 
about some approaching foot-soldiers (brigandi) and assembled to decide on their course of 
action, one of the villagers took the opportunity to say that ‘the nobles were false traitors’ (nobiles 
essent falsi proditores)75. This apparent non-sequitur would make more sense as an effort to use the 
situation for political ends, and apparently it was perceived in such a light. Although these words 
did not provoke an uprising (commotio), they were nonetheless understood as seditious by the 
village’s noble captain, who imprisoned and fined the offender. The use of military insecurity to 
provoke aggression against the nobility need not, of course, have originated solely with the 
Parisians or to serve their interests, but in the context of Marcel’s alleged efforts to stoke such 
                                                 
72 Published in d’Avout 1960, 304–310, at 308 and Delachenal 1909–1931, II, no. 26. 
73 …audit peuple donnoient entendre que nous les voulions destruire et faire pillier par noz Genz d’armes, que abandone avions ladite 
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 N. 60 and 29, above, respectively. 
75 Seine-et-Marne, ch.-l. de con AN JJ 86, no. 585, fol. 212. Notably, it was the presence of ‘enemies’ near Moret in 
December 1357 that had led the royal bailiff to hire gens d’armes (see above n. 22). 
fears and the city’s precarious position vis-à-vis the Dauphin and his noble allies, it is worth 
considering the possibility. 
 
Conclusion 
In an article of this length it is not possible to do more than to sketch the problem and some 
possible solutions to it. The geography and timing of the Jacquerie and the language used to talk 
about it in the documents strongly suggest that military depredations were not the immediate 
cause of the revolt. There were some limited areas of overlap between places occupied by 
soldiers – be they English, French, Navarrese, or freebooters – and places attacked by Jacques, 
but most of the uprising took place in areas that had heretofore escaped the experience of 
pillage. Furthermore, although the distinction between soldier and noble was not always a clear 
one and there are some instances of conflation (whether by unconscious association or 
instrumental design), the documents describe the Jacquerie’s targets almost exclusively as les 
nobles, rather than gens d’armes, soudoiers, brigans, etc.  
Nevertheless the military insecurity caused by the variety of troops to the west and south of Paris 
was of significant importance. Even if communities had not themselves experienced 
depredation, they were aware that this had happened elsewhere nearby, and that they might 
themselves fall victim in the future. These sorts of prospective anxieties were behind efforts to 
pull down local castles and to establish communal alliances for self-defense. Such efforts pre-
dated the Jacquerie, but they were also central to the mechanism of the revolt, which was 
organized through village assemblies and concentrated on the destruction of castles. The timing 
and geographic spread of the revolt make a great deal of sense in connection with the position 
espoused by Luce and Cazelles that the movement was closely connected with the Parisian 
efforts against the Dauphin and his noble allies. Marcel was accused of stirring up fears about 
soldiers’ violence to incite people against the Dauphin, and such anxiety, in connection with 
established efforts to prevent troops’ depredations, could well have been manipulated in the 
service of the Parisian rebels’ cause.  
 
 
 
